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Abstract 
Objectives:  To  identify the main challenges and security issues of virtualization in cloud computing environments.  It 
reviews the alleviation techniques for improving the security of cloud virtualization  systems.  Methods/  Statistical 
Analysis: Virtualization is a fundamental technology for cloud computing, and for this reason, any cloud 
vulnerabilities and threats affect virtualization. In this study, the systematic literature review is performed to find out 
the vulnerabilities and risks of virtualization in cloud computing and to identify threats, and attacks result from those 
vulnerabilities. Furthermore, we discover and analyze the effective mitigation techniques that are used to protect, secure, 
and manage virtualization environments. Findings: Thirty vulnerabilities are identified, explained, and classified into 
six proposed classes. Furthermore, fifteen main virtualization threats and attacks are defined according to exploited 
vulnerabilities in a cloud environment. Application/Improvements: A set of common mitigation solutions are recognized 
and discovered to alleviate the virtualization security risks. These reviewed techniques are analyzed and evaluated 
according to five specified security criteria. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Cloud computing has been developed to enable the 
Information Technology world for utilizing computer 
resources efficiently and more proficiently1. The cloud 
users have an advantage of unlimited computing power 
available on demand, in which they can access and pay 
for services when need it. Users will be able to accomplish 
computing services without the need for any significant 
investment in information technology infrastructure2. 
Cloud computing is an efficient way to increase the 
capacity dynamic scalability or add capabilities using 
virtualization resources, platform, infrastructure and 
software as service that can be accessed over the inter- 
net3. To improve the utilization of cloud resources we use 
Virtual Machines (VMs). The virtual machine is a virtual 
computer similar to a physical computer in which appli- 
cation or operating system can be installed and run4. 
Virtualization is an innovative technology, which is 
significantly expanding in the Information Technology 
industry. It provides multiple logical resources on a single 
server. Various benefits that can be provided by the vir- 
tualization are hardware utilization, resources protection, 
remote access, and other resources5. This technique gives 
organizations and people an opportunity to improve the 
use of hardware by increasing the number of tasks that 
one machine can handle. 
Two significant benefits that can be provided by a 
virtual machine are resources sharing and isolation6. 
Traditionally, the physical machine dedicates available 
resources permanently to all applications that are run- 
ning on the computer, and this may cause waste in some 
resources such as memory and storage space. Whereas, 
in the virtual environment, resources are shared among 
numerous VMs and entirely used on demand. Isolation 
means failure in any VM will not affect the performance 
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or efficiency of other VMs running on the same host. 
The virtual environment enables VM to isolate data from 
other VMs, i.e., a program runs in one VM cannot see 
programs that are running on other VMs. 
Virtualization is used to match the customers’ require- 
ments for security, control, economy, scaling, speed, and 
so forth. It may affect the choice of cloud service provider. 
Furthermore, it empowers the cloud users to start up and 
shut down their resources rapidly, which can be in some 
applications has its advantage7. 
1.1 Virtualization Architecture 
Virtualization architecture is a model, which determines 
the interrelationships among particular virtual compo- 
nents, such as an operating system, network resources, 
servers, and storage spaces. In general, the virtualization 
is based on a hypervisor. The hypervisor isolates operat- 
ing systems and applications from system hardware, 
whereas the host can run multiple Virtual Machines 
(VM) as guests that sharing the physical resources of the 
system, such as processors, memory, network bandwidth, 
and so forth. Virtualization architecture might be divided 
into two types, hosted and bare-metal architectures as 
shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Hosted vs. bare-metal architecture. 
 
In hosted architecture, first, an essential Operating 
System (OS) is installed on the host system, and then a 
hypervisor or VM monitor software is installed on the 
top of OS. This OS-based architecture entirely enables the 
user to control multiple guests OSs, or VMs installed on 
the hardware. Hosted virtualization architecture is sub- 
stantially less complex to implement, and it is more useful 
for software development, running legacy applications, 
and supporting different operating systems. However, it 
has some severe disadvantages due to controlling the vir- 
tual machines by operating system directly8. Therefore, it 
turns out to be more straightforward for an attacker to 
inject malicious attacks or DoS attacks to the kernel of the 
operating system. The entire virtualization infrastructure 
can be influenced, and the attacker can have control over 
all virtual machines and might able to damage the virtual 
machines later. In the second architecture, the hypervisor 
runs directly on the host hardware. Like hosted archi- 
tecture, VMs and higher layer applications are installed 
above the hypervisor. 
The cloud-computing environment can be virtual- 
ized on every layer of cloud computing services, such as 
IaaS resources including virtualized storage, networking, 
and servers, or virtualized datasets, and development 
environments in PaaS, and any software application 
instances. The rapid expanding of cloud computing and 
virtualization technology make cloud infrastructure 
more complicated and have brought a series of security 
threats. This study aims to identify the main challenges 
and security issues of virtualization in cloud computing 
environments. Furthermore, it reviews the alleviation 
techniques for improving the security of cloud virtualiza- 
tion systems. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
The method used in this study is presented in the next 
section. The third section presents an overview of the secu- 
rity challenges and vulnerabilities. Then, we review the 
security threats and attacks on the virtual environment. 
Finally, some solutions and techniques proposed in the 
literature review to alleviate potential threats and attacks 
are discussed. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
 
A Systematic Literature Review (SLR) is performed to pro- 
vide comprehensive summary of existing literature relevant 
to a research since it helps in collecting research evidence 
from current relevant studies. In SLR, we try to have as 
many researches as possible that answer our research ques- 
tions and help us achieve objectives of the study. 
2.1 Terminology 
In this section, the main terms are defined and adopted 
as follows: 
Challenge: something new, difficult, or complex, which 
requires great effort by user to determine and solve it. 
Vulnerability: an occurrence of weakness in opera- 
tion, in software, and in the infrastructure that can be 
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exploited by a party to perform malicious actions. The 
vulnerability can also be in the existence of an error in 
design or implementation that can cause unexpected, 
undesirable actions. 
Risk: the potential that the vulnerability is exploited 
to cause a threat as well as the effect resulting from this 
serious event on the organization. 
Threat: any circumstance or action that exploit one or 
more vulnerabilities to harm the assets. 
Attack: an assault on the security of the system from 
a deep threat; which is an attempt to alter, expose, steal, 
destroy, disable or get unauthorized access to assets. 
2.2 Research Questions 
The research questions are the major core of a systematic 
literature review. In order to get existing studies, the fol- 
lowing research questions have been formulated: 
Q1. What are the main vulnerabilities and risks of vir- 
tualization in cloud computing environments? 
Q2. What are the potential threats or attacks that 
exploit virtualization vulnerabilities? 
Q3. What are the major security techniques and 
approaches used to alleviate the security risks? 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
 
 
In this step, we search for relevant work that satisfies the 
certain criteria. When we started to research, we made a 
great effort due to the wide scope of our research ques- 
tions. After several trials, the search strategy was agreed 
upon. The keywords that are used during the research: 
challenge, vulnerability, risk, threat, attack, approach, 
solution, and framework. To be more precise, we used the 
virtualization term with keywords. 
As we sometimes used AND or OR to be more 
accurate results, we used the keywords in  the differ-  
ent databases such as ACM Digital Library, EBSCO, 
Google Scholar, IEEE Xplore, ISI Web of Science, 
ProQuest, ScienceDirect, Scopus, Springer Link, and 
Wiley Online. We did not restrict the results of the 
search based on publication year because we  want  to 
be as inclusive as possible. Therefore, for each database, 
we used the default settings for the start year of pub- 
lication. Table 1 shows the number of results for each 
sources. We got 53324 of results after the search opera- 
tion. After we remove based on title we had 35275 of 
results. 
Table 1. Results before and after removal 
 
Sources The number of result After removal 
ACM Digital 
Library 6052 5224 
EBSCO 2500 1489 
Google Scholar 2000 1271 
IEEE Xplore 20100 18248 
ISI Web of Science 541 99 
ProQuest 1171 700 
ScienceDirect 5738 1865 
Scopus 3051 1158 
Springer Link 8771 3428 
Wiley Online 3400 1793 
Total 53324 35275 
The important step in the process of selection a study 
is to identify exclusion and inclusion criteria. Studies that 
were excluded: 
t None English research. 
t That indicates to very specific and limited domain. 
t That do not relate to virtualization security issues in 
cloud computing. 
t That do not relate to mitigate the security issues of 
virtualization 
t That is discussing cloud without relating it to virtual- 
ization security issues. 
t That is discussing cloud without point to mitigation of 
security issues of virtualization. 
t That is editorial papers prepared for special issues. 
t We included all the studies that: 
t Discuss virtualization vulnerabilities, risks, threats, or 
attacks in cloud computing environment. 
t Propose the appropriate security techniques to miti- 
gate the virtualization security issues. 
The steps of the selection process are described below: 
1. By using a SQL query, 21389 of results were dis- 
carded based on some keywords, such as storage 
security, management, VLAN, trust, industry, digital, 
E-Commerce, E-learning, mobile, and VM backup. 
2. By reading the title, the abstract, and sometimes the 
conclusion of the remaining 13886 papers, we dis- 
carded 13486 papers. 
3. By reading 400 of results completely, we left with 148 
of results. 
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Figure 2. Security vulnerabilities and risks categories. 
 
 
4. Taxonomy of Virtualization 
Challenges 
 
 
Many vulnerabilities and risks are existing in current 
virtualization technologies that an attacker can exploit  
to penetrate the security and privacy systems in cloud 
computing environments. In this study, we have classi- 
fied vulnerabilities into several categories regarding their 
characteristics and relevance to virtualization technology. 
Figure 2 shows these defined categories and its vulner- 
abilities and risks. 
4.1 Virtualization Characteristic-Related 
Issues 
The essential characteristics that make virtualization 
technology suitable for cloud computing  are  mobil-  
ity, transience, state recording, isolation, and scalability. 
Although all these characteristics constitute a successful 
virtualization environment, the characteristic of virtual- 
ization technology causes some risks to cloud systems. 
This section demonstrates common vulnerabilities and 
risks that may arise due to a characteristic of virtualiza- 
tion technology. 
Incorrect VM Isolation (VC1): The hypervisor is 
responsible for ensuring isolation between the different 
VMs9. The isolation between virtual machines prevents 
the VM from direct access to others’ virtual disks, appli- 
cations, or memory on the same host10. Isolation of virtual 
machine limits the scope of the attack. Furthermore, iso- 
lation of virtual machine makes more difficult for the 
attacker accessing resources and access unauthorized 
data on the physical machine11. Each VM is isolated from 
each other virtualized machines and its host physical 
system12, so if one VM is break-down, it does not affect 
any of the other VMs on the same host. A violation of the 
isolation principal happens when the attacker uses a com- 
promised VM for communicating with other VMs on the 
same host (Unauthorized communication). Moreover, 
violation of the isolation principal occurs when one VM 
affects other VMs located on the same host13. Therefore, 
a shared environment requires an accurate configuration 
for maintaining strong isolation. 
Unsecured VM Migration/Mobility (VC2): 
Migration technique is one of many advantages of 
Virtualization. It enables the application to be transpar- 
ently transmission from one host machine to another 
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without halting the virtual machine14. After migration, 
the application continues in execution without any loss of 
progress. VM migration is done by transmitting the appli- 
cation along with its VM’s entire system state, including 
memory, the state of CPU, and sometimes disk too, to 
the destination host. VM migration offers many valuable 
advantages such as load balancing, and conserves energy. 
Moreover, the migration of virtual machines is useful 
in case of hardware failure. It migrates the VM to another 
execution host and performs maintenance or repair 
operations on the source execution host15. Although 
migration technology introduced many advantages, it 
raises some security issues. Live migration is relatively a 
new term where its security issue is yet to be discussed. 
It is potential that the attacker may passively steal and 
snoop or actively modify confidential information during 
migration. Therefore, the transmission channel has to be 
protected and secured against different passive and active 
attacks. 
VM Diversity (VC3): Many IT enterprises over- 
come the problem of security by enforcing homogeneity, 
as all devices must have the latest patching software. 
Virtualization can facilitate more efficient usage models 
that get the benefit of implementing older or unpatched 
versions of the software. This solution causes a set of chal- 
lenges such as the need to maintain patches or provide 
other protection for different operating systems in addi- 
tion to addressing the risk posed by the presence of many 
unpatched or old devices on the network16. 
Uncontrolled Scaling (VC4): Virtualization technol- 
ogy allows the creation of new virtual machines easily and 
quickly on demand. Scalability provides a very cost-effec- 
tive way to handle business expansion and any additional 
resources of the server requirements. Users can have sev- 
eral particular purpose virtual machines, for example, 
for testing or viewing purposes. The growth in the num- 
ber of VMs depends on the available space on the host. 
Generally, the scalability of cloud facilities gives greater 
availability17. The number of VMs can overgrow, and this 
makes management tasks more exacerbated, where all 
machines must be scanned, and patched for vulnerabili- 
ties18. 
VM Transience (VC5): In the physical computing 
environment, users have one or more devices that run 
online most of the time and are in a stable state. In con- 
trast, VMs in a virtualized environment can come and  
go from the network intermittently19 (i.e., it is never in a 
stable state). 
If the computer is online most of the time, then it is 
more vulnerable to be attacked, since the offline server 
cannot be accessed. By enabling users to start and stop 
virtual machines remotely, attackers have no enough time 
in preparation for attacking the VM. Although VM tran- 
sience limits the chance in which attackers can exploit for 
compromising the system, it makes security audits and 
maintenance more challenging because machines must 
be online when scanned or patched. Compromised VMs 
can infect other vulnerable machines and can go offline 
before detection. 
Non-updated Snapshot & Restore VM (VC6): The 
ability of a virtual machine to recover from an error to   
a previously defined state is often considered a security 
benefit for restoring a guest VM to a pre-attack state. 
Most VMs pick a snapshot of the virtual disk content on 
a time interval or when changes are made20. Although the 
system can be restored smoothly and quickly, some secu- 
rity issues appear through a rollback system. If the VM 
restored to a compromised or unpatched state, this leads to 
exploit old vulnerabilities until updating state in the next 
cycle. Furthermore, the rollback can re-enable the secu- 
rity credentials that were previously disabled. The most 
severe risk through Rollback could reveal stream ciphers 
that were used for encryption and an attacker could easily 
acquire the original plaintext. So critical information is 
compromised, and if it is not detected, every encrypted 
data from this point on will not be safe21. 
4.2 Infrastructure Issues 
The Infrastructure of virtualization includes any hard- 
ware and software components required to support 
virtualization purposes. Much vulnerability may arise 
from virtualization infrastructure. 
Insecure Hypervisor (I1): Utilizing the hypervisor 
or virtual machine manager (VMM) to support many 
VMs on a single physical machine has become popular 
recently. It increases hardware usage and provides flex- 
ibility in system management. The hypervisor provides 
an abstraction layer to separate VMs from the physical 
hardware and isolates them from each other. It controls 
all aspects of the underlying VMs, including communi- 
cating with each other. This communication never goes 
to the real network22. On the other hand, the hypervisor 
must support a strong security base for VMs. If it is not 
secure, the attacker can gain control over the hypervisor 
and compromise any VMs running on it. Furthermore, 
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if an attacker exploits the vulnerable hypervisor, he can 
control the hypervisor, and get access to or redirect sensi- 
tive data23. 
VMs Image Sharing (I2): A VM image is a pre-pack- 
aged software template that contains the configuration 
files that are used to create VMs. The VM images provide 
an easy way for deploying and restoring virtual systems 
efficiently and quickly across numerous of physical 
servers24. Sharing VM images is commonly used in some 
environments of cloud computing as a quick method to 
get started. Users of cloud computing can create their VM 
image from scratch or can make utilization of existing 
images in the shared repository. For example, Amazon 
introduces a public image repository where legitimate 
customers can upload or download a VM image25. 
Although of these benefits or advantages, VM image 
introduces some risks that in turn effect on the security 
of the cloud computing. Therefore, the integrity of these 
images is an essential security requirement for services 
provided by cloud computing. 
Unprotected Shared Clipboard (I3): A shared clip- 
board is a feature that allows data to be transferred among 
VMs on one side and between VMs and host on the other. 
The host can monitor the traffic between the underlying 
VMs because the network packets that come from or go 
to a virtual machine pass over the host. However, it may 
cause the hacked host to compromise all VMs operat- 
ing on it. It can serve as a gateway to attack the system. 
Moreover, unprotected shared clipboard allows exchang- 
ing data between the cooperating malicious programs in 
VMs26. 
Co-location of Multiple VMs (I4): Co-location of 
multiple VMs is a presence of multiple VMs on the same 
host that share resources in order to ensure improved effi- 
ciency, flexibility, and thus reduced the operational cost27. 
Co-location of multiple VMs on a single server increases 
the surface of potential attack and the risk of VM-to- 
hypervisor or VM-to-VM. 
Resource Sharing (I5): Cloud service providers need 
Virtualization technology to deliver their services in a 
scalable manner when sharing infrastructure, platforms, 
and applications. Although the ability to share hard- 
ware resources of one physical device among multiple 
isolated VMs to optimize hardware used and save cost, 
it may cause security vulnerabilities to the virtual environ- 
ment. Sharing resources such as CPU, memory, storage 
space among VMs, may result in unauthorized com- 
munication between guests VMs28. In general, sharing 
resources reduces the security of connected VMs because 
an infected VM can access other VMs through resources 
they share. Organizations with permission to access the 
infrastructure can control the infrastructure or view other 
data29, For example, the cloud services provider has differ- 
ent instances for each user but uses the same application 
code. Moreover, data of different customers will be loaded 
on the same database server, which leads to data leakage 
among these tenants30, giving the attackers opportunity 
for hijacking user credentials, controlling and eavesdrop- 
ping information of other users31. 
Poor VMM Resource Allocation (I6): The physical 
layer interacts with the virtual layer through the hyper- 
visor or VMM, which allocates required resources to 
each VM on demand. The VM must be restricted to spe- 
cific isolation. The VMM is responsible for preventing 
VMs from requesting more resources whereas the VM  
is missing its reserved resources32. Poor VMM resource 
allocation allows a VM to use resources that are not 
within its allocated resources, thus preventing the other 
VMs from using their resources, in some cases, this leads 
to denial of service. 
Insecure APIs (I7): A cloud-computing provider pro- 
vides infrastructure, software, and platform services to 
the users and enables them to access and manage services 
by the published Application Programming Interfaces 
(APIs) via Internet33. APIs may impose a variety of secu- 
rity issues such as improper authorizations, clear-text 
authentication, or data discovery during transmission, 
which affect the availability and security of the cloud 
services34. An attacker could use APIs to undermine the 
confidentiality and integrity of customers’ data. He uses 
the token that used by customers to get access to the ser- 
vice through API for manipulating their data. 
4.3 Access and Communication Security 
Issues 
The user interaction with the cloud begins when he 
attempts to access cloud services. The user must first 
authenticate his identity before accessing cloud services. 
The communication process arises when the user and the 
cloud exchange data or services. 
Furthermore, there are communications between 
VMs within the cloud that introduce vulnerabilities that 
may affect the host machine and all VMs running on it. 
An illegal user can exploit access and communication vul- 
nerabilities related to access and communication security. 
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Hidden Identity (AC1): In physical computing envi- 
ronments, there is usually a custom identity correlated to 
a physical device such as MAC addresses, or device ID. 
It is used to differentiate between devices and determine 
who the owner of a machine is. This static method is not 
effective in virtual environments due to creating VMs 
dynamically or mobility of VMs that make it very diffi- 
cult to identify or track the owner of a VM running on a 
particular physical host35. 
Insecure Channel (AC2): The cloud service provid- 
ers use the Internet as a communication infrastructure   
to provide services to customers or transfer their data. 
An efficient and secure transmission channel is a critical 
component in a cloud environment and forms the basis 
for managing information and any related processes36. 
When transmitting the data from users to the cloud envi- 
ronment, the data must be sent using an encrypted secure 
transmission channel such as SSL/TLS. It protects net- 
work traffic against a potential interception attack. 
VMs-VMs or VMs-Host Communications (AC3): 
In a cloud-computing environment, communication 
mechanisms in virtual networks are similar to those used 
in real networks. In the same way that physical devices are 
connected, virtual machines are connected and built on a 
network infrastructure of the host to connect to the public 
network37. VMs need to communicate and share data. If 
the connection does not meet critical security standards, 
they become a target for attacks. The virtual network 
uses virtual switches or bridges that connect the virtual 
network interface cards to the physical network interface 
card of the host machine to exchange data38. However, the 
virtual network traffics are visible for all VMs that share 
the same physical data-link, which potentially leads to 
security risk. 
Weak Authentication and Session Management 
(AC4): Authentication is a mechanism used to deter- 
mine whether something or someone is what or who      
it is declared to be. Authentication techniques protect 
the system against bad actors that masquerade as legiti- 
mate users, developers, or operator to read, delete, and 
modify data. In a virtual environment, the authentica- 
tion mechanism applies to end users and to components 
of the system. Most of the widely utilized authentica- 
tion methods are poor and may affect access and control 
policy. Sometimes, it is easy to break some authentication 
mechanisms that have weakness in their design, such as 
one-factor authentication mechanisms, to get access to 
the system39. 
4.4 Data Security Issues 
The significant challenge in data security is how to share 
sensitive data in a virtual insecure environment-Data 
Security concerns about data protection from intentional 
modification by an unauthorized person. 
Improper Data Sanitization (D1): Elasticity and 
resource pooling features allow a set of resources to be 
allocated to different users later. When the user accesses 
a memory service or storage space, he can recover data 
from another user who previously used the same stor- 
age space40,41. Sanitization is a method to clean or destroy 
data from a storage resource when it is available for other 
users42. In the public cloud, sometimes the data must be 
deleted entirely at the request of the client, including the 
log files and backup replicas prepared for recovery43,44. 
The data destruction might be complicated because 
many replicas of data can be distributed in many loca- 
tions. Thus, it is difficult to guarantee a service provider 
can remove all copies of the backup45. Data sanitization 
is a significant task to discard appropriately physical 
resources and data that are sent to the trash. Improper data 
sanitization may expose the data to the risk, for example, 
may lead to data loss or data disclosure since hard disk 
may be disposed of without being wiped entirely or may 
not be destroyed due to continued use of other tenants46. 
Improper Management of Credentials (D2): 
Organizations need user credentials to control and allow 
the user to access his sensitive data. The deployment of 
the credential management system is an essential way 
to manage user credentials. Improper management of 
credentials indicates to weaknesses in the way used to 
manage the credentials such as lack of enforcement or 
verification of password  strength47.  This  vulnerability 
is exacerbated in Virtualized environments that share 
unprotected transport channels, which may increase the 
number of actors who can sniff credentials during trans- 
mission. 
Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity (D3): 
If the system fails to verify the validity or origin of the 
data, it may accept invalid data. Lack of data authentic- 
ity might arise in different situations. It includes the poor 
design and implementation, such as the improper chosen 
of data-authenticity mechanisms, improperly verifying 
the signatures, cross-site request forgery, and improper or 
missing verification of integrity47. 
Security Misconfiguration (D4): Virtual systems 
often rely on many interoperating software components 
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that must be dynamically configured to support 
virtualization in many applications. The security con- 
figuration is vital for providing security to customers. 
Misconfiguration can compromise the security of users, 
applications, and the entire system. It arises when security 
settings are defined and maintained as a default setting39. 
The impact of virtualization vulnerabilities increases 
when a security configuration fails, mainly if the behavior 
of the virtual component depends on another component. 
Permissions and Privileges Management (D5): 
Authentication mechanisms are used to verify the user 
identity and to enable the authorization policy. Thus, 
authorization policies are implemented using security 
measures to grant or deny access to resources. Improper 
permissions and privileges management refers to fail- 
ure in privileges management, permissions, and other 
security features used for enforcing access control. In 
particular, it incorporates issues caused by implementing 
without the required privileges or assigning an incorrect 
privilege, dropping or reducing errors and preserved or 
insecure inherited permissions44. In virtualized envi- 
ronments, the complex nature of the privileges and the 
multiplicity of the layers of administrative required for a 
virtualized environment lead to emphasize this weakness, 
mainly when thinking about its dynamics, and scenarios 
where federations and migrations are in place. 
Improper Input Validation (D6): It means the sys- 
tem does not check user input or fails to validate input. 
Therefore, the system may be exposed to and accept 
malicious input, which may cause the system to execute 
arbitrary code, or modify control flow47. 
4.5 Control and Monitoring 
In a traditional network environment, the physical 
machines use the specific port on the monitored switch 
for connecting to the network. In a virtual environment, 
the deployment of the vast VMs can be appended to the 
same physical port on the network. 
The communication between these virtual 
machines never goes through the physical port, i.e.,  
they can communicate with each other, as they are part 
of one single virtual switch. The nature of the virtualiza- 
tion environment introduces some vulnerability that can 
be exploited by the attackers such as lack of visibility and 
monitoring VMs from the host. 
Lack of Visibility (C1): The hypervisor is responsible 
for establishing communication between VMs located 
on the same host. Therefore, physical network security 
mechanisms, like network-based intrusion  detection  
and prevention systems, cannot monitor the inter-VM 
traffic24, because the traffic over a virtualized environ- 
ment never goes through the physical network. This issue 
becomes a significant challenge as malicious activities 
of the VMs bypass the security monitoring tools. Some 
hypervisors enable network monitoring their capabili- 
ties not as strong as those in tools utilized to monitor the 
environment of the physical networks17. 
Monitoring VMs from the host (C2): The most sig- 
nificant issue is to secure the host rather than monitoring 
each VM individually, as long as the control point in the 
virtual environment is the host device. Inter-VMs traffic 
passes through the host, which manages these VMs. A 
breach of the host may lead to compromise all VMs run- 
ning on it48. 
4.6 Security Policies and Rules 
Security policies refer to the plans, practices, and rules 
that must be well defined, comprehensive, and clear for 
regulating access to the system or for addressing con- 
straints on functions of the system and flow between 
them. Any vulnerability in these policies leads to differ- 
ent threats. 
Lack of Security Policies (P1): It is needed to develop 
virtualization security policies, where virtual machine 
deployment, management, migration, and shutdown 
requirements are established securely. The lack of secu- 
rity policies may cause some vulnerability that lead to an 
unsafe environment for the host device, virtual machines, 
and virtual administration tools. 
User Awareness (P2): Cloud service users are the 
weakest point in any information security because cloud 
service providers do not check the surrounding of their 
customers. Suspicious user accounts can give attackers 
an opportunity to do any malicious work without being 
identified. Furthermore, there are attack vectors for vari- 
ous social engineering that an attacker might use to trick a 
victim into entering a malicious site, and then gain access 
to the user’s computer. From this point, it can monitor 
user actions and view the same data as the user sees and 
can steal user credentials to authenticate the cloud ser- 
vice itself. Security awareness is a security concern that 
is often overlooked49. The misuse of open cloud services 
by users often allows an attacker to access the system, so 
users should learn about different potential attacks and 
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how to avoid them to ensure that users understand and 
assume their responsibilities. 
Static Policies (P3): VMs can be moved between 
physical environments as needed to get additional 
resources. Accordingly, baseline security policies of VMs 
must be transferred as they move from one environment 
to another. If the security policy of the VM does not con- 
form to the new environment, VM becomes vulnerable50. 
Furthermore, when the VM moves, it loses its perfor- 
mance history and must re-evaluate its baselines. 
Loss of Governance (P4): The cloud provider is 
responsible for data security while handling and storing 
it. Rules or policies must be clear between the cloud pro- 
vider and individuals or enterprises. In many cases, the 
client essentially gives up control to the cloud service 
provider on many security-related issues, but sometimes 
the service providers themselves may not be trusted51. 
Furthermore, they unaware of any security or control 
mechanisms specified by the cloud provider52. The loss 
of control and governance can have a significant impact 
on the organization’s strategy and consequently affect 
the ability to fulfill its mission and objectives. The loss 
of governance and control can also lead to a lack of data 
availability, integrity, and confidentiality8. Reducing pro- 
cessing and data storage costs is an essential requirement 
for any company, whereas data analysis always is a man- 
datory task for decision-making. Therefore, companies 
will not transfer their data to the cloud environment until 
they trust the security procedures by service providers. 
Lack of Reliability and Availability of Service (P5): 
Reliability issues in virtualization can affect cloud perfor- 
mance. Collecting many VMs may cause performance 
problems3. Some challenges like limited CPU or I/O bot- 
tlenecks lead to performance problems. These problems 
occur more in virtualization environment more than in 
the traditional environment due to connecting the physi- 
cal server to many VMs that compete to access critical 
resources. IT organizations should be able to monitor the 
usage of VMs and physical servers in real time. This capa- 
bility avoids overuse of server resources and reallocates 
resources according to given business requirements53. 
 
5. Security Threats and Attacks 
 
 
This section identifies common threats and potential 
attacks of virtualization security by performing a system- 
atic literature survey. 
VM Hoping/Guest jumping: An attacker is mali- 
ciously getting access to different virtual machines 
belonging to other customers54. He can monitor the target 
VM’s resource utilization, and affect VM’s integrity, avail- 
ability, and confidentiality55. 
Malicious Insider: A malicious insider intentionally 
misuses the authorized access in a manner that negatively 
affects information systems56,57. 
Malicious VM image: A user may use a VM image 
that contains malicious code to create own VM. This 
image makes the entire system vulnerable to attack58. 
VM escape: An attacker gets access to the hypervi- 
sor and escapes from its control59. An infected VM can 
completely bypass the isolation between the VMs and 
the host60. Consequently, can get privileges to access the 
resources shared, with other VMs61. 
Hyper-jacking/VM-based Rootkit: Hyper-jacking 
attack inserts VM-based root kits to control the entire 
virtual environment62. 
Virtual memory Leak: A system failure may occur 
between the allocation and deallocation of the shared 
memory area in the hypervisor, which may lead to virtual 
memory leaks63. 
Theft-of-Service: Use cloud services or resources for 
a long time without being registered in a billing cycle or at 
the expense of another user64,65. 
VM sprawl/VM Spawl: Increase the number of VMs 
continuously, while some of them are in idle state, this 
may lead to waste the resources in the host machine66. 
VM poaching: It occurs when malicious VM exhausts 
resources and completely consumes the hypervisor 
against other VMs running in the same host67. 
Accounting, Service, and Traffic Hijacking: It 
occurs when the attacker gets access to users credential 
and becomes able to spy on their transactions, manipu- 
late data, return falsified information and redirect them 
to illegal sites68,69. 
Cross-VM: It occurs when a malicious VM bypasses 
virtual isolation between VMs to attack other VMs in 
the same host70. It could exploit vulnerabilities in the OS 
guest or hypervisor to obtain confidential leakage data 
from other VMs through the side-channel attack71,72. 
Co-location/Co-resident: Unlike cross-VM attack, 
the attacker has a clear target VM and aims to co-locate 
own VM with victim VM on the same physical host. With 
co-residence, the attacker constructs covert side channels 
to obtain sensitive information from the victim73. 
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Foot-printing: It occurs when an attacker intelli- 
gently collects information indicate to vulnerabilities of 
a victim platform operates in a virtualized environment. 
This information might be used to carry outmalicious 
activities on the system74. 
VM rollback attack: The attacker exploits the sus- 
pend/resume feature in a virtualized environment to 
attack VMs75. When the hypervisor suspends a victim 
VM at any points and makes a snapshot of its state, the 
attacker triggers a pre-defined infected snapshot to the 
VM at resume time. As a result of missing some secu- 
rity updates, an attacker could bypass certain security 
checks in the VM to achieve the attack target76. 
Data leakage/Data loss: Data leakage occurs when 
sensitive information falls into the wrong hands when it 
is audited, stored, processed, or even transmitted77. While 
Data loss occurs when data is lost due to loss of encryp- 
tion key, accidental deletion, or natural disaster78. Table 2 
shows security threats and correlates them with their 
exploited vulnerabilities in cloud computing environ- 
ments. 
 
Table 2. Mapping between threats and vulnerabilities 
 
Threat Vul. 
VM Hoping/Guest jumping I1, I3, I4, I5, VC1, VC2 
Malicious Insider P1, P4 
Malicious VM image I2 
VM escape VC1, VC2, I1, I4, I6, C1, C2, 
D4, D6 
Hyper-jacking/VM-based 
rootkit I1, I2, I3, AC3, VC2 
Virtual memory leak D1, I6 
Theft-of-service attack P4, D4, I1 
VM sprawl/VM Spawl VC2, VC3, VC4, I2, P4 
VM poaching I6 
Accounting, service and 
traffic hijacking D2, P4, P1, AC4, I7 
Cross-VM attack VC1, VC2, I1, I4, I5, I7, D1, 
D4 
Co-location/Co-resident 
attacks I4, VC1 
Foot-printing attack AC2 
VM rollback attack VC2, VC6, P1 
Data leakage/Data loss D1, P4, D5, AC4, P5, P1, I6, 
I1, I5, I7, AC3 
6. Virtualization Security Solutions 
 
 
Many types of research offer solutions in virtualization 
security. These solutions may be useful for centers and 
organizations interested in developing cloud security 
solutions and standards. In this section, we focus on some 
solutions covered in the literature survey. HyperSafe61 is 
an approach proposed to provide control-flow integrity 
for the Type-I bare-metal hypervisors. This approach 
relies on two techniques. The first one protects code 
integrity of hypervisor by preventing memory pages from 
being manipulated at execution time. Authors have used 
Write Protect bit (WP bit) to check how the supervisor 
code acts with write-protection bits in page tables. The 
write-protection is skipped if the WP is off, otherwise, it 
is decided if the supervisor can write or not to the mem- 
ory page. In order to allow the good updates to proceed, 
the WP bit is temporarily cleared right before each update 
and then re-enabled immediately after the update. 
The other techniques protect control data by con- 
verting them into restricted pointer indexes. It extends 
the protection provided by the first technique from code 
integrity to control-flow integrity to prevent attacker form 
controlling the flow of the system. HyperSafe aggregates 
control data into target tables and then replaces them 
with a restricted pointer index. 
A VM security monitoring model based on memory 
introspection has been proposed79. Security of host or VM 
can be recognized by using a hardware-based approach to 
obtain real-time physical memory of the host. Moreover, 
a VM Control Structure (VMCS) based approach is pro- 
posed for VM memory forensics. Based on the results of 
memory forensics of host/VM malicious behavior can be 
detected. These techniques were used to develop a proto- 
type of a VM defense system that is called VEDefender, 
which incorporates a PCI device and a terminal program. 
The VEDefender prototype was implemented on top of 
kernel-based VM (KVM). 
VEDefender is transparent to the guest machines, and 
it is hard to be accessed even from a compromised VM.  
It can gather and analyze data for discovering any mali- 
cious activity whether being on the host or guest machine. 
Experiments results show that the proposed system can 
deal with virtual machines from different OS  versions 
and has an acceptable execution time.Authors80 leveraged 
the nested virtualization to propose an  in-the-box  way 
for monitoring the hypervisor - In-Hypervisor Memory 
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Introspection (IHMI). In the proposed architecture, 
Hypervisor Address Space and the Monitor Address Space 
are separated from each other, and Virtualization Exception 
(VE) handler operates between them. In order to protect 
and isolate the monitor from the untrusted hypervisor, a 
protected address space is used. The hypervisor and the 
monitor are isolated from one another through Extended 
Page Table (EPT). The memory content of the hypervisor 
is protected by setting it non-writable to the hypervisor, 
and any attempt to modify it will generate an EPT viola- 
tion or VE, which means that the hypervisor’s execution is 
suspended. The hypervisor and monitor memory isolation 
is achieved using a unidirectional mapping, which allows 
the monitor to have access to the hypervisor’s memory 
while forbidding the reverse. By using VMFUNC instruc- 
tion, the switch between the hypervisor and the monitor 
can be performed without involving the nested hypervisor, 
which leads to improved performance. For secure context 
switching between the hypervisor and the  monitor,  the 
VE handler is non-writable for the hypervisor. To disable 
the untrusted hypervisor’s influence, the checker disables 
interrupts and uses a new stack, and checks the VE infor- 
mation area. 
HyperSentry81 is a framework allows stealthy and in- 
context integrity measurement of the running hypervisor 
or other highest privileged software. Taking advantage of 
the Intelligent Platform Management Interface (IPMI) an 
out-of-band communication channel is used to trigger 
the System Management Interrupt (SMI), which trig- 
gers the HyperSentry for integrity measurement. When 
an SMI occurs, the current CPU state is saved, and the 
context is switched to the System Management Mode 
(SMM). HyperSentry constitutes of two components: the 
SMI handler and the Measurement Agent. Trust on the 
SMI handler is obtained during the boot when its code is 
copied to the SMRAM, and then the SMRAM is locked to 
prevent from access or modification. When a request for 
integrity measurement is received, HyperSentry requires 
the access to the hypervisor’s code, data and CPU state 
needed for measurement. 
Unlike many works that try to protect the Virtual 
Machine Monitor (VMM) from malicious VMs attacks, 
an approach proposed to protect VMs from a compro- 
mised VMM. CloudVisor82 is a transparent prototype 
system that resides below a commodity VMM leveraging 
the hardware-assisted (nested) virtualization. 
It protects the privacy and integrity of VMs owned 
resources (such as CPU, memory and I/O device), by still 
letting the VMM allocate and manage resources for VMs. 
CloudVisor interposes interactions in-between the guest 
VMs and VMM through a clearly defined entry and exit 
points. Differently, from traditional virtualization systems 
that have a composite TCB including VMM and manage- 
ment tools that are more prone to attacks, CloudVisor 
excludes them from TCB. With CloudVisor all accesses 
that are not from VM itself only can view encrypted VM’s 
data. CloudVisor architecture is organized in such a way 
that VMM is still responsible for resource management, 
VM construction and destruction, and scheduling, but   
it is monitored transparently by CloudVisor to ensure 
the protection and isolation. In the nested virtualization 
scheme, host mode runs CloudVisor, while in guest mode 
runs VMM and guest VMs. To secure control transition, 
CloudVisor keeps a VM control structure for each VM, 
by which it controls what kind of instruction or events 
lead to a VM exit. To protect memory, it uses a two-step 
address translation, using page table and EPT. Among 
others, CloudVisor provides memory isolation, tracking 
memory ownership, legal memory accesses, handling 
data exchange with I/O storage, disk I/O privacy and 
integrity. 
Secure MMU83 and HyperWall84 also separate the 
memory resources management from the security pro- 
tection, but with no need of a nested hypervisor. Secure 
MMU is a hardware-based mechanism aims to isolate 
and protect the guest VMs memory from other VMs  
that share the same physical system and even from an 
untrusted hypervisor. Secure MMU makes a separation 
so that the hypervisor still performs resource manage- 
ment but with limitations. A hardware controller is used 
to update the page mapping and set a pointer to the nested 
page table. TCB of the proposed approach contains only 
the hardware system, excluding the hypervisor. 
Hardware-assisted secure virtual machine85 (H-SVM) 
is an extension of Secure MMU. It is hardware-based 
virtual machine isolation and  protection  that  intends  
to minimize the architectural changes that support vir- 
tualization. Direct updates of page tables by hypervisor 
are blocked by H-SVM to ensure memory isolation. All 
changes that a hypervisor needs to make in nested tables 
are made by requesting to H-SVM. H-SVM protects the 
integrity and confidentiality of guest VMs, excluding the 
availability. 
HyperWall is a hardware-based architecture developed 
to support hypervisor-secure virtualization. Even though 
the hypervisor is not trusted, HyperWall still allows it to 
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manage the platform resources freely. According to cus- 
tomer requirements/specifications, the guest VM’s are 
protected by Confidentiality and Integrity Protection (CIP) 
tables from hypervisor or DMA access. Furthermore, this 
architecture allows the server to verify the provided hard- 
ware protections to the cloud customer and cleans the 
VM’s memory and state in case of termination. 
CIP tables protect VM memory, which includes map- 
ping of access rights for the hypervisor and DMA to the 
memory pages. Even if a page is not protected, thus, it 
allows access to the hypervisor and DMA; it is assigned to 
a VM so that the compromised hypervisor cannot assign 
it to another VM. Whenever a new VM is created, termi- 
nated or there is a change in the memory assigned to a 
VM, the CIP tables are updated. CIP tables are stored in a 
portion of DRAM not accessible to any software. Physical 
memory used by VM during runtime, physical to machine 
memory mapping tables and the protection specified by 
users (pre-CIP data) also are protected. Encryption keys 
are used for customer verification, to protect the proces- 
sor state of a VM when it is terminated, and for external 
communication. The HyperWall prevents VM rollback 
attack by disabling some functionalities of the hypervisor 
such as suspend/resume function. 
As compared to HyperWall, a solution to protect from 
VM rollback attack has been proposed75, while keeping the 
virtualization functions such as VM suspend/resume and 
VM migration. This goal is achieved by logging all VM 
rollback activities, and then the user can audit the log and 
examine suspicious rollbacks. This solution requires min- 
imal user interaction, and it is based on the CloudVisor. A 
NoHype86 architecture has been introduced for removing 
the virtualization layer. It prepares a more secure virtu- 
alization layer by minimizing its size or securing it with 
additional hardware. In the NoHype architecture, each 
processor core is allocated to run just one VM. It means 
guest VMs cannot share processor cores, which eliminate 
the need for the hypervisor. The number of VMs is lim- 
ited to the number of processor cores, while the memory 
is partitioned between the VMs. Thus, each guest OS 
can access a dedicated physical memory on a host. Every 
guest OS can access its assigned physical device directly 
at a given time. 
Unlike HyperWall, H-SVM, NoHype, HyperCoffer76 
can protect against physical attacks. Hardware and 
Software frameworks aim to provide integrity and pri- 
vacy for VMs by trusting only the processor chip. 
External memory or devices are considered untrusted by 
the HyperCoffer, so it requires memory encryption and 
integrity checking. Due to low overhead, HyperCoffer 
uses address-independent seed encryption87 (AISE) for 
encrypting memory, and Bonsai Merkle Tree (BMT) for 
checking integrity, in addition to VM-Table for multiplex- 
ing. VM-Table contains the VMID, which is the unique 
index of a VM. It is stored in a portion of the physical 
memory of CPU that is accessible only to the processor. 
Logging and auditing are used by HyperCoffer to secure 
against VM rollback attack. Since every time the pro- 
cessor installs or resumes a VM, the hash of a vector 
containing some necessary information for AISE and 
BMT is added to a chain in a nonvolatile register, which 
can be audited from the user. In the meantime, the mem- 
ory snapshot image is encrypted and protected by BTM, 
which is encrypted further by an encryption key assigned 
to a VM during runtime. 
The proposed framework14 called secure live virtual 
machine migration (SLVM). This framework aims to 
protect against network intrusions, viruses, attacks and 
preserves the integrity and the confidentiality of migra- 
tion data. SLVM has two modules: Common Security 
modules that apply to both the host VM and the Guest 
VMs underlying this host and Individual/Per VM security 
module that is specified separately the security require- 
ments for each virtual machine running over the host. 
To protect the virtual machine migration process 
from data tampering by a Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) 
and time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTTOU) prob- 
lem, a two-level security framework88 has been proposed. 
After selecting a VM for migration to reduce power con- 
sumption in a cloud environment, a destination host 
needs to be selected for that VM. The second task is more 
complicated because it can create a situation that the des- 
tination host cannot fulfill the VMs requested resources. 
To secure the system from TOCTTOU, Authors have 
proposed to use a token system. Before the request for 
available resources in the network is made, the node first 
asks for the token. If the token is not already in use, then 
it can broadcast its request. 
The components of CoM framework38 are virtual 
machine migration agent (VMMA), security context 
migration agent (SCMA), and live migration control-  
ler (LMC). Five steps are used to perform the migration. 
First, The VMMA allocates resources at the hypervisor 
where VM is going to migrate. In step 2, The VMMA 
copies VM’s pages in an incremental way whereas SC set 
of migrated VM is transferred by the SCMA. 
Nadiah M. Almutairy, Khalil H. A. Al-Shqeerat and Husam Ahmed Al Hamad 
13 Vol 12 (3) | January 2019 | www.indjst.org Indian Journal of Science and Technology 
 
 
 
In the third step, VM stop working on the source 
hypervisor. Then the VMMA copies remanding memory 
pages and the CPU state to destination hypervisor. The 
destination SEs will receive the changed SC set at the 
source. Finally, the migrated VM continues in execu- 
tion on the destination host. Trusted cloud computing 
platform89 (TCCP) provides a closed box execution envi- 
ronment. It ensures a confidential execution for guest 
VMs. TCCP guaranties that the privileged administrator 
of the cloud provider cannot investigate or tamper with 
the customer’s VM. Furthermore, it provides an attesta- 
tion feature to the user, so that the users before launching 
their VM they can know if the IaaS service is secure or 
not. To achieve this, the TCCP should enforce a security 
perimeter and restrict the VM execution inside it. If the 
admin remotely logs to a VM, he cannot have access to 
VMs memory. 
The TCCP extends the concepts of the trusted plat- 
form to a whole IaaS backend service. The TCCP trusted 
computing base is composed of two parts: a trusted VMM 
(TVMM), and a trusted coordinator (TC). Each node in 
the cluster runs a TVMM to host customer’s VMs. The 
TC manages the set of trusted nodes that are placed 
inside the security perimeter and run the TVMM.VNSS90 
is a framework that aims to ensure distinct security level 
requirement for VMs as well as full lifecycle protection 
for VMs. The framework is composed of security sand- 
box controller (SSC), security policies create an agent 
(SPCA), virtual machine creates agent (VMCA), virtual 
machine migration agent (VMMA), security context 
migration agent (SCMA) and security policies migration 
agent (SPMA). SSC maintains the schedule of all these 
agents. During VM creation, the SCC calls the VMCA 
which will create an instance of the virtual machine, and 
then the SPMA that will generate security policies for the 
VM. Initially, SSC triggers VMMA, SCMA, and SPMA 
upon VM migration. VMMA is responsible for moving 
the VM instance, while SCMA synchronizes the security 
context of VM, and then SPMA resumes security policies 
of VM on the destination host. 
sHype91 is a secure hypervisor architecture which 
controls information flow between different operating 
systems that share the same hardware platform. It pro- 
vides mechanisms that control resource sharing since 
resource sharing is inevitable in distributed services. The 
mandatory security controls implemented by the hypervi- 
sor are the isolation of VMs and resource sharing among 
them. sHype implements a secure reference monitor 
interface to enforce constraints on the information flow 
between VMs. In the sHype access control architecture, 
the reference monitor is implemented by enforcement 
hooks, which get access decisions from the access control 
module (ACM). ACM defines and applies access rules 
based on the formal security policy. 
Another work to provide strong isolation between 
numerous of VMs is a Second level VMM92 (SeVMM). 
SeVMM aims to control the sharing resources and provides 
isolation between VMs. Moreover, it manages and controls 
the virtual resources such as virtual processor by intercept- 
ing the entire security-related calls among guest and host 
operating system. SeVMM supports a different of security 
policies such as the CW, BLP, TE, to guarantee the integrity 
of the inter-domain data flow and the system. Flask frame- 
work is used to configure security strategy in SeVMM. It is 
composed of three modules to achieve objectives. The first 
module is the Security Policy Management module, which 
manages the whole security policies and protects the modi- 
fication and update of security policy in the third module. 
When the resource is initialized, the security attribute is 
allocated according to the security policy in this module. 
The second module is a Safety Hook module responsible 
for controlling access to the shared virtual resources by 
gaining some information about VMs such as types of 
operations and attributes of virtual resources and then 
transfer this information into the third module. 
The third one is a Security Policy Enforcement mod- 
ule, which takes a decision based on the security policy 
and information given by hook.Researchers54 proposed a 
scheme for securing the inter-VM communication traffic 
by limiting the access to the critical resources. The control- 
ling and analyzing inter-VM traffic are done via an addition 
frame tag through an agent to the payload of the packet. It 
aims to recognize sending the application in a communica- 
tion within the same tenant. Virtual Firewall architecture 
(V-firewall)8 aims to protect and inspect the inter-commu- 
nication of VMs to protect against potential attacks in the 
internal and external networks. In addition to protection 
against flooding and spoofing attacks. In this architecture, 
V-firewall is installed on the hypervisor whereas Agent is 
on guest OS. The gent is used to monitor outbound and 
inbound traffic to VM and send logs to V-firewall to decide 
grant or deny traffic according to security policies. 
Hypervisor-based virtualization technology3 aims to 
secure the cloud environment. It adds some reliability/ 
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security monitoring units: VM security monitor (VSEM), 
VM reliability monitor (VREM) which are in the VM level. 
Two monitoring units also are added in the hypervisor 
level, hypervisor security monitor (HSEM) and hypervisor 
reliability monitor (HREM). There are VSEM and VREM 
units within each running VM. VSEM monitors the VM 
behavior and sends a report to HSEM. VREM monitors 
some parameters that are related to the reliability such as 
the workload. It sends useful information to the HREM 
and gives a resource to VM according to its state. HREM 
detects the attacks overflow depending on the  requests 
and then notifies HSEM about it. A Virtual Machine 
Introspection93 (VMI) Based Architecture takes advantage 
of virtual machine monitor (VMM) technology for estab- 
lishing intrusion detection systems. It allows good visibility 
of the monitored host’s state, while still maintaining strong 
isolation between the monitored host and the IDS because 
it resides “outside” of the host it monitors. 
Virtual Machine Monitor provides isolation of IDS from 
the monitored host in the VMI IDS architecture. VMM pro- 
vides a communication interface between itself and VMI 
IDS, which allows the later one to send inspection, monitor, 
and administrative commands. VMwall94 is presented for 
inspecting the Internet traffic. VMwall is a tamper-resistant 
application-oriented firewall that takes advantage of appli- 
cation-level firewalls and isolation provided by the virtual 
machine. Isolation of application-level firewall is achieved 
by placing it in a trusted VM, which depends on the 
hypervisor to restrict the attack between trusted VM and 
malicious VM. VMwall uses VM introspection to detect 
another VMs process connected to a suspected network. It 
depends on the requirement to find the head of linked data 
structures, correct order in addition to the length of data 
structure fields, so the attacker cannot alter them. 
VMwall provides a tamper-resistant, independent and 
lightweight verification architecture using VM isolation 
and VMI. The design VMwall has two major components: 
a kernel module and a user agent. The kernel component 
intercepts all incoming or outgoing guest VMs network 
packets and applies per-packet policy provided from the 
user agent to decide whether to allow or drop every packet. 
On interception process, if a firewall rule for the packet 
exists on its rule table, it acts depending on that rule to 
allow or drop the packet. Otherwise, it calls the user agent 
to create a rule for it. Until the user agent provides the rule, 
the kernel module queues the incoming packets. Then,  
the rest of the packets from that connection are handled 
depending on that rule. The user agent obtains the policy 
by introspecting the processes executing on the guest VM 
and assessing the legitimacy of such processes. First, it 
attempts to identify the sending/receiving VM depending 
on the packet’s source/destination IP, and then finds the 
process bounded to the source/destination port. 
If the user agent does not find a process (in its 
whitelist) bounded to the port, it will block the connection. 
Otherwise, it will allow the connection. To overcome the 
theft-of-service attack against cloud services, an external 
API66 has been proposed for calculating the power con- 
sumptions of VM at different times while the user is using 
the VM. This API will detect and prevent theft-of-service 
attack depending on the statistics of power consumptions 
of a VM. The API is stored on an external cloud so that 
the API’s integrity can be maintained in case the cloud 
that hosts VMs is compromised during the attack. The 
API computes the power consumption of VM’s processes 
by adding the measured power consumption at different 
intervals of time. Later, API can compare the calculated 
VM’s power consumption from this API with the calcu- 
lated power consumption from the internal cloud. In case 
that there is a difference, the API can notify the adminis- 
trator about this, or the user can be charged depending on 
the external calculated power consumption. 
 
6.1 Comparison of Mitigation Techniques 
The reviewed mitigation techniques and solutions, in the 
previous section, are compared in this study based on the 
following five criteria: 
1. Data Confidentiality: any solutions encrypt the data 
in transit, disk, or memory satisfy the data encryption 
criterion. 
2. Data Integrity: any solutions protect VM data from 
being altered satisfy the integrity criterion. In addi- 
tion, any solutions compute the hash of data in transit 
satisfy this criterion. Solutions that maintain the 
integrity of the hypervisor code satisfy this criterion. 
3. Securing the Hypervisor: any solutions protect the 
code of hypervisor or detect the malicious activity in 
hypervisor satisfy the securing hypervisor criterion. 
4. Securing the VM: any solutions present mechanisms 
to secure VM satisfy securing VM criterion. 
5. Control access: solutions that imposed policies to 
access the resources. 
Table 3 summarizes the comparison between the 
reviewed solutions mitigation techniques and the 
specified security criteria. 
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Table 3. Comparison of the mitigation techniques 
 
 
Solutions 
Security Criteria 
Data 
Confidentiality Data Integrity 
Securing the 
hypervisor Securing the VM Control access 
HyperSafe  √ √   
VEDefender   √ √  
IHMI  √ √   
HyperSentry   √  √ 
NoHype   √  √ 
CloudVisor √ √  √  
Secure MMU √ √  √  
H-SVM √ √  √  
HyperWall √ √  √  
HyperCoffer √ √  √  
SLVM √ √  √  
A two-level 
framework 
   
√ 
 
CoM framework    √  
TCCP √ √  √  
VNSS    √  
sHype     √ 
SeVMM     √ 
Securing inter-VM 
traffic 
   
√ 
 
V-firewall    √  
VMI    √  
VMwall    √  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
 
The rapid expanding of cloud computing and virtu- 
alization technology make cloud infrastructure more 
data confidentiality, data integrity, securing the hypervi- 
sor, securing the VM, and access control. 
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